The history of (pro) creation by Griffin, JGH
1 
 
THE STATE OF CREATIVITY: 
THE FUTURE OF 3D PRINTING, 4D PRINTING AND AUGMENTED REALITY 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE HISTORY OF (PRO) CREATION 
Since the inception of the State, creativity has been of critical importance. This chapter introduces the 
basic concepts of how creativity has been central and continues to be so. It argues that the 
development of legal rules has seen a gradual shift away from the consideration of creativity as a 
relevant factor in regulation. This has been exacerbated through the use of proprietary and capitalistic 
concepts. This chapter outlines the subsequent chapters, and provides an indication of the reforms that 
are proposed later in the monograph. 




3D printing has been hailed as a revolution. “Now a third [industrial] revolution is under way. 
Manufacturing is going digital.”1 It has been claimed that 3DP will rewrite the norms of distribution, 
fundamentally altering the way in which distribution occurs, marking a shift away from traditional 
factories to local, home based, production. 2  This is known as the “Maker Movement”3: 
 
“In recent years 3D printing has become a hot topic in the media, in industry and in 
academia. Some claim that 3D printing will soon enable us to print, rather than buy, all 
the products that we normally obtain from stores—from clothing, automobile parts 
and guns to various foods, medication and spare parts for our home appliances. Some 
even claim that printing living tissues and organs is just beyond the horizon.”4 
 
This monograph argues that the claims that 3DP will revolutionise society are misleading. 3DP is an 
evolution of existing machinic technologies, an evolution of the ways of making things. 3DP allows the 
making of things to be more globally connected than before by the utilisation of the Internet, whilst 
being more localised than traditional manufacturing methods by the existence of the printer in the 
home. However, the most critical element about 3DP is the way in which it reveals shortcomings of 
our current regulatory system, and the way in which individuals interact with the State. It reveals that 
our States, founded upon creativity, are on the verge of collapse.5  
 
                                                          
1 Anon, The Economist, ‘The Third Industrial Revolution’ available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553017  
2 European Parliament, Three-dimensional printing: intellectual property rights and civil liability European 
Parliament resolution of 3 July 2018 on three-dimensional printing, a challenge in the fields of intellectual 
property rights and civil liability (2017/2007(INI)) 
3 C Anderson, Makers, Business Books (2012) at 20. 
4  B Berg, Introduction, at 1, in B Berg, S Hog, E Kosta (eds) 3D Printing: Legal, Philosophical and Economic 
Dimensions, Asser Press (2016) Chapter 1. 
5 The approach pursued here focuses on creativity, but the reader may also wish to look at J Diamond, 
Collapse, Penguin (2006). 
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Making things is a key element of what it is to be human. We cannot help but to create, be that due 
to necessity6 or for enjoyment.7 As will be explored throughout this monograph, this is apparent in our 
history from our earliest times.8 It is an argument central to numerous philosophical works.9 3DP is a 
technology that enables us to make things in a way that has previously been more difficult to achieve. 
In this sense, it mirrors developments such as the production of paper, the printing press, and the 
Internet. It is an evolution. 
 
3DP technologies reveal some of the current issues relating to the regulatory relationship of human 
beings with the State. Whilst there has always, in some form or other, been regulation of the ways in 
which things are being made, the spectre of technological convergence means that the ways of making 
things are more likely to be regulated, and with the increased potential for additional future regulation. 
Convergence is where technologies combine different functions into a single unit, and thus also pull 
together existing regulations.10 Digital regulations have the power to lead to greater observation by 
the State, and hence the possibility of attempted control. There has been discussion about how 3DP 
leads to convergence of existing areas of IP such as patents and copyright law.11 This work argues that 
3DP regulation reveals inherent shortcomings in State regulation, namely a failure to acknowledge the 
importance of creativity, and that any reform of the law for 3DP should also entail a broader reform of 
creativity regulation.  
 
This introductory chapter outlines (1) how creativity in the forms of collaboration and conflict have 
been an integral part in the history of humankind, and argues that these aspects should be considered 
in the legal regulation of creativity. There is then (2) an introduction to the relationship between the 
creative individual and the State, with a focus on aspects such as capitalism. Subsequently, there is (3) 
an outline of the following chapters. 
 
 
(1) Creative collaboration and Conflict: An inherent human condition 
Throughout the history of humankind, humans have had to create to survive, from the invention of 
hunting tools through to modern day farming.12  Forming into groups improved hunting efficiency and 
use of resources.13 However, the existence of groups also resulted in conflict between those groups, in 
addition to conflicts between individuals within a group.14 Collaboration and conflict have been central 
                                                          
6 “[Technology] deals with human work, with man’s attempts to satisfy his wants by human action on physical 
objects” M Kranzberg and C Pursell, The importance of technology in Human affairs, in M Kranzberg and C 
Pursell (eds), Technology in Western Civilization Volume I, OUP (1967) Chapter 1 at 6; G Basalla, The Evolution 
of Technology, CUP (1988). 
7  Or indeed, for other superfluous ends – consider “Thus, invention is often the mother of necessity, rather 
than vice versa” J Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, W W Norton (1997) at 242. 
8 Infra p.***. 
9 Infra p.***. 
10 Infra p.***. 
11 Infra p.***. 
12 P Watson, Ideas, Phoenix (2005) at 33; J Pfeiffer, The Creative Explosion, Harper & Row (1982) throughout, 
L Keeley, War before civilisation, OUP (1996), R Leakey, The origin of humankind, Science Masters (1994) at 
12, S Parker, Evolution: The Whole Story, Thames and Hudson (2015) at 531. 
13 J Pfeiffer, ibid., Chapters 3 &4; L Keeley, ibid., throughout. 
14 L Keeley, supra 12 Chapter 2 onwards. 
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themes to the development of humankind, and have underlain and remain a central part of the 
creation of culture. Such conflict and collaboration run through all aspects of human culture. Even at 
a biological level, the level at which human culture begins its formation (for without the human body 
there would be no culture),15 collaboration within the human body is necessary for survival, and it is 
of course necessary for the survival of the species for reproduction. At a social level, it is necessary for 
the inclusion of the individual into society. By the same token, conflict also exists at the biological level, 
in that it arises with biological diseases; and it also exists in the social form either within society (e.g. 
as a crime) or in the form of war.16 Conflict may exist with the allocation of resources. The balancing 
of these interests is what has led to the creation of culture, led to the development of complex 
technologies, and led to more complex collaborative and conflicting interaction between members of 
society. Today, works of culture build a complex web of collaborating interrelationships, but based 
around a degree of competition and proprietary IP boundaries. That balance between conflict and 
collaboration should reflect the human agency involved, at both the biological and sociological level; 
and this should feed through into any attempts at regulation of creative technologies such as 3DP. 
Competition and collaboration have been key concepts throughout the history of both the 
development of humankind and humankind’s culture. Berger and Luckmann suggest that a human is 
nothing if he is not socialised with others, that he would not be much more than an animal. “Homo 
Sapiens is always, and in the same measure, homo socious.”17 At the same time, though, humankind is 
dependent on conflict, which is perhaps inherent within aggressive behaviour18 and territoriality.19 
Conflicts over food resources or space could easily have been the cause of early conflicts between 
modern humans and other homo species, or perhaps between groups of modern humans.20 Early 
conflicts appear to have been focused around small skirmishes that would have led to groups of 
modern day humans distinguishing themselves from one another.21 These groups would, in time, come 
to form on an increasingly larger scale to form those such as nationalities; and those nationalities 
would, in time, come to war. 22 
What is remarkable is the extent to which conflict and collaboration extend deeply within the human 
condition and human culture. Life may be brutish and short23 when we do not collaborate with others. 
War and peace is an external embodiment of this condition, but it is deeply rooted within the biological 
nature of a modern day human being – and within all forebears. Unless we understand this biological 
                                                          
15 The regulation of the human body is considered within the biopower notion of M Foucault, ‘Truth and 
Juridical Forms’ in J Faubion (ed) Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Penguin (2002) Volume 3 
16 L Keeley, supra 12. 
17 P Berger and T Luckmann, ‘The Social Construction of Reality’ Penguin, Essex (1967) at 69. 
18 K Lorenz, On Aggression, Metheun (1966) and discussed in J Bronowski, The origins of knowledge and 
imagination, Yale University Press (1978) at 8. 
19 R Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative, Dell (1966).  
20 L Keeley, supra 12,  W Divale, Warfare in Primitive Societies, ABC (1973); R Ferguson, The Causes and 
Origins of ‘Primitive Warfare:’ On Evolved Motivations for War 73(3) Anthropological Quarterly 159 (July 
2000). 
21 L Keeley, ibid., chapter 2. 
22 L Keeley, ibid. chapter 12. *** 
23 T Hobbes, Leviathan, (1668; Penguin (2017)) "Chapter XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind As 
Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery." 
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side to humankind, it will not be possible to construe and avail to ourselves a deep understanding of 
why it is that conflict and collaboration are such a central part of our lives and the development of our 
culture and modern-day technologies such as 3D printing.24 To begin with, over 90% of the human 
body does not come from the womb of the mother.25 Setting aside the issue of regenerating tissue, 
the human body consists of over 90% symbiotic bacteria.26 More recently, 3DP is also seeing more use 
of machinic and biological prosthetics as an integral part of the human body.27 If the human body 
comprises of so much matter that is not purely ‘human,’ then quite clearly collaboration is vital to our 
survival even at the lowest biological level. Indeed, viruses and diseases that destroy the human body 
are those that interfere with the process of collaboration, most notably of all cancer.28  Within the 
human body, therefore, collaboration between elements is vital to the longevity and health of the 
body. At the same time, however, it is similarly vital for some elements of the body to be more 
aggressive. White blood cells will attack, for instance, other cells in order to ensure appropriate 
functioning of the human body.29 Conflict and collaboration is therefore vital within the human body 
and this extends through to the wider relations between modern day people. 
Modern day humans are therefore a large grouping of complex biological systems, of which we are 
consciously unaware in day to day life and culture despite their integral interlinked nature.30 Our 
understanding of what a single person is tends to be therefore highly subjective upon our own 
interpretation as an individual. We do not tend to think of other people, or of their works, for instance, 
as being the consequence of complex biological systems. Thus, in the vast majority of human contact, 
the underlying biological systems, and the collaboration and conflict that goes on within, is largely 
irrelevant in our understanding of humans and human regulation – but the biological systems, and 
their inherent collaborations and conflicts - are nonetheless critical for regulation. 31  
Regulatory and biological systems are closely related, and should not be separated – one not only 
deeply influences the other to the smallest degree, but is integral to its very operation.32 It is not that 
the cultural work cannot exist without the biological system; it is that the cultural work cannot exist, 
be understood, without that biological system of conflict and collaboration. Without the biological 
systems, creative works (e.g. 3DP works) would not exist. Similarly, Foucault writes “Knowledge 
                                                          
24 Indeed, this is where Adam Smith may have fallen short in his discussion of the “Invisible hand” – here, the 
theory is that individuals are involved in economic society, working for their own advantage yet leading to a 
growth in economy and thus without understanding the whole picture as to why there is that growth – the 
same being true of any governing body. Conflict and collaboration is a means to understand the invisible 
hand. See A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776; Penguin (1999) Books IV-V)), Book IV, Ch.II. 
25 For further information see J Dupree and O Malley ‘Varieties of Living Things’ 1 Philosophy and Theory in 
Biology 3 (2009) at 13. 
26 Symbiotic Bacteria is bacteria which lives in symbiosis with each other or with other another organism. 
27 Infra Chapter 2 p.***. 
28 See inter alia A Vassilev, M De Pamphilis, Link between DNA replication, stem cells and cancer, 8(2) Genes 
45 (2017). 
29 B Alberts, A Johnson, J Lewis, et al., Molecular biology of the cell, 4th edition (2002) Chapter 22. 
30 Cf. Luhmann – he makes this same point, as a way of saying the systems are different. N Luhmann, ‘The 
Autopoiesis of Social Systems’ reprinted in 6 Journal of Sociocybernetics 84 (2008). *** 
31 For further discussion see e.g. S Fuller, Humanity 2.0, Palgrave Macmillan (2011). 
32 Supra 30; cf D Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, OUP (1970) at 177. 
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doesn’t form part of human nature. Conflict, combat, the outcome of the combat, and, consequently, 
risk and chance are what gives rise to human knowledge… It cannot be deduced from the instincts 
themselves.”33 Again, it must be stressed that knowledge, that conflict and combat to which Foucault 
refers, is ultimately reliant on the biological human body.  
Most of the time, the biological aspect tends to be approached as a given. An example of this would 
be our manner of interpreting sounds or vision – highly complex operations that we tend not to 
consider within everyday activity, and yet plays a function within creation.34 However, there are specific 
situations where the biological aspects come to the fore and become more prominent. For instance, 
illness will occur within humans but this may lead to them being ostracised from a society.35 
Nonetheless, a core concern is that many of the biological processes inherent for creativity are not 
understood. The difficulty in us understanding even basic biological relations was recently emphasised 
by Ashwin. He has been investigating the ways in which single celled organisms interact with one 
another. One of his findings was that even at this level, the relationships between the cells were 
incredibly complex and difficult to understand: 
“One of the most surprising results of this investigation is that robust heteroclinic cycles 
and switching heteroclinic networks can occur in very simple asymmetric architectures 
with just three or four cells.”36 
Simple celled organisms thus can involve complex operations. Any attempt to classify our 
understanding of the relations between humans, or indeed their conflicts, will be something that will 
require a certain degree of assumption.37 Over time, a certain set of rules and understandings have 
developed. Whilst there are many who have argued that the human soul has innate knowledge, 38 
there has been relative consensus that the human body has played a crucial role in enabling individuals 
to be able to collaborate or conflict with one another. This has been most developed by philosophers 
                                                          
33 M Foucault, ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’ in J Faubion (ed) Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Penguin 
(2002) Volume 3, at 8. One could argue that this is inconsistent with some of his discussion concerning 
biopower.  
34 J Bronowski, Science and Human Values, Pelican (1964) at 10-17; J Bronowski, The Origins of Knowledge 
and Imagination, Yale University Press (1978). 
35 W Jopling, Leprosy stigma 62(1) Leprosy Review 1(March 1991). 
36 M Aguiar, P Ashwin, A Dias, And M Field, ‘Dynamics  of  coupled  cell  networks: Synchrony,  heteroclinic 
cycles and inflation’ 21 Journal of Nonlinear Science 271 (2011) at 273  
37 Science is, at best, our approximation of things around us that will be subject to change. Newton’s three laws 
of motion, as published in Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (I Newton, Philosophiæ Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica (1687; University of California Press (2016))). His theory of gravitation remained 
accepted until Einstein argued that light could be effected and bent by gravity (A Einstein, “Does the inertia 
of a body depend upon its energy-content?” (1905) in A Einstein, H Lorentz, H. Minkowski and H. Weyl, The 
Principle of Relativity, (trans W Perrett and G Jeffery), Dover (1952)). 
38 Notably R Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641; CUP trans B Williams and J Cottingham (1996)) 
in section III. See also, for instance, Malebranche argued that God acted through the soul to motivate 
individuals and to provide innate ideas to the individual. N Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on 
Religion, CUP (1997, trans. N. Jolley and D. Scott ); N Malebranche, The Search after Truth, CUP (1997, T. M. 
Lennon and P. J. Olscamp (trans.), Ohio State University Press, (1980)). 
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such as Locke, Hegel or Kant, where the individual is reliant upon their senses to be able to understand 
and interact with the environment around them.  
Locke (1632-1704)39 was one of the key philosophers to consider the impact of physical surroundings 
on individuals. He stressed that the individual obtained his knowledge from his surroundings. 
Furthermore, he argued that by observing the world, it was possible to infer future knowledge. Locke 
argued ideas come from the combination of existing thoughts. These thoughts arise from the 
observation of events. 40  Locke develops this further by reference to “passive” and “active” powers,41 
“passive” powers being those such as observation, and ‘active’ powers being the re-use of the 
information gleaned.  Locke provides an example of Billiards, where if a ball is hit with a cue, an ‘active’ 
power is at work moving the ball.42 The observer may, in turn, learn how to carry out that ‘active’ 
power.43  Hegel (1770-1831) took a different approach and stressed the importance of using the human 
senses to influence the world around the person. To grow as a person, as a human being, Hegel argued 
that it is necessary to alter the world around the individual – to exert the will: 
“A person has the right to direct his will upon any object, as his real and 
positive self. The object thus becomes his.”44 
Hegel continued to stress the importance of possession over an object in order to change it.45 He did 
however suggest that with intangibles “..one hesitates to call such gifts, knowledge, powers, mere 
things, because although they may be bargained for as a thing, they have an inner spiritual side. Hence 
the understanding becomes confused as to how they are to be regarded at law. Before the 
understanding always arises an exclusive disjunction, which in this case is that something must either 
be a thing or not a thing.”46 Thus, without the senses, it might not be possible to change the physical 
world, and the person would not consequently be realised.  By contrast Kant (1724-1804), in the 
                                                          
39 In this regard Locke could be argued to be building on the work of Plato – to summarise, “The body and 
sense -organs belong to the fluctuating physical world, and the mind is an immaterial being conversant with 
the Forms.” D Allan, The Philosophy of Plato, OUP (1970) at 117. Whilst not detailed here as Locke is largely 
representative of the knowledge theory literature, the reader may also consider also the works concerning 
knowledge of D Hume (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777), published by Hackett (1993)),  
G Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) published by Collins (1962)), G Leibnitz, New essays 
concerning human understanding (1765; The Macmillan Company trans A Langley (1896)) and E Condillac, 
Essay on the origin of human knowledge (1756; CUP trans H Aarsleff (2001)).  
40  J Locke, Essays on Human Understanding, (1689; William Tegg & Co, Leeds (1880)), Book IV Chapter I at §8. 
41 J Locke, Essays on Human Understanding ibid. at §2. 
42 J Locke, Essays on Human Understanding ibid. at §4.  
43 J Locke, Essays on Human Understanding ibid. at §4. 
44 G Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ((1820) trans. Dyde, Prometheus Books, (1996)) at §44. 
45 “Taking possession is partly the simple bodily grasp, partly the forming and partly the marking or 
designating of the object. Addition. – These modes of taking possession exhibit the progress from the 
category of particularity to that of universality. Bodily seizure can be made only of particular objects, while 
marking an object is done by a kind of picture-thinking, In marking I keep before me a representation, by 
which I intend that the object shall be mine in its totality, and not merely the part which I can hold in my 
hand”. G Hegel, Philosophy of Right, (1820) ibid., §54) 
46 G Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ibid., at §43. 
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Critique of Pure Reason,47 suggested that there was certain innate knowledge within an individual – he 
termed this synthetic knowledge. This is knowledge than can be applied across the world that we 
know. For example, time and space are things that we identify as universal understanding. Outside of 
this synthetic knowledge is analytical knowledge, which is what identify more from our surroundings 
by thinking or analysing them. In his view analytical knowledge is key, but that this is bounded by the 
concept of ‘thing in itself’ whereby those things around us may remain inaccessible. Tools that are 
used in the communication or making of things may also hold a special status, essentially becoming a 
part of the utilizer as part of the expression.48   
The ability to interpret what is observed therefore has a great bearing upon the way in which we accept 
the world we find around us. Our ability to see at a particular level of depth is a major influence in the 
relations that we have with others; as are our other senses, such as hearing or vision.49 It is these 
faculties, and our ability to interpret what they provide, that enables us, on a large scale, to partake 
within the broader humankind and which influence our ability to develop our culture. However, this 
ability remains simultaneously enabled yet constrained by our desires for collaboration, and our need 
for conflict. When we create, when we think of new thoughts, we are effected by the manner in which 
we collaborate and conflict with others. Sometimes this will be overt, as in the obvious instance of 
collaborative authorship or country to country warfare, but all the time there will be subversive 
influence. Our ability to interact with the world is influenced through collaboration and conflict. There 
develops over time a split between the notion of one’s own private knowledge and that of public 
knowledge,50 just as there is a split in the understanding of object, source and encrypted code in 
machinic digital technologies.51 Control over that knowledge is influenced by collaboration and 
conflict, and it influences the relationship of the individual with the State. It influences the core 
rationalities of how the State is perceived by the individual.52  
(2) Creativity, the State and the Individual 
Creativity is therefore what has driven us, as a species, forwards; to make us achieve, to make us create 
from the mind what does not yet exist in our reality. From the moment in which the human becomes 
conceived, the process of creativity begins. The human infant comes to terms with their 
surroundings,53 with other humans, and so begins the process of creativity. It is from the web of 
                                                          
47 I Kant, Critique of Reason, CUP (1799, tans. M Gregor, 1997) supra Error! Bookmark not defined.-  
cf to R Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy supra 38. 
48 Consider M Heidegger, The origin of the work of art (1950) in D Krell (ed), Martin Heidegger: Basic writings, 
Routledge (2011) Part IV. 
49 E.g. M Changizi, Harnessed: How Language and Music Mimicked Nature and Transformed Ape to Man, 
Benbella Books (2011), J Bronowski, supra 18 Chapter 11. 
50  S Wolin, Politics and Vision, Allen and Unwin (1961) at 3, 9, and 17;  A Plato, The Republic (380BC) (good of 
the individual and the good of the Community) and Cicero, De Officiis (44BC, trans. Walsh, OUP, (2008)) when 
referring to a commonwealth as res publica). 
51 Consider J Griffin, “The rise of the digital technology ‘meritocracy’: legal rules and their impact” 15(3) 
Information and Communications Technology Law 211 (2006).  
52 Infra Chapter 3.*** 
53 P Berger and T Luckmann, ‘The Social Construction of Reality’ supra 17 (1967), Part 2 Chapter 1. 
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creativity that great civilisations and societies develop. It is from this that life has come to develop to 
its current form, and will develop new forms, new futures.54  
However, creativity is under threat, and it is under threat from certain types of relations between 
individuals and groups. The spider web of creativity, with its inherent multidimensional flexibility, is 
being made more rigid. There has been a lack of emphasis upon the centrality of creativity within 
societal dialogue, with a focus instead upon dialogues which are misleadingly representative of 
creativity.55 Some of these dialogues, such as property and capitalism, have pushed the discourse in a 
manner which has led to a seismic, misleading, shift in the direction of human thought away from 
creativity. Whirlpools, currents and eddies in the discourse fabric of capitalism suck up the imaginative 
spirit, diverted toward capitalist ends rather than creative ends.56 Capitalism might be about creating 
money through the process of capitalisation on debt, but that very process, though creative, sucks up 
other creativities within its folds, for an economic unit is a unit which within its borders is one which 
inhibits other creative freedoms.57  These folds are integral elements related to boundaries of the units 
of exchange such as legal property.  Each unit is a representation of some thing and capitalism in turn 
represents that as a unit within exchange.58 The provision of lending, of debt, to make for the creation 
of money does not necessarily equate to broader creativity. This is self-evident in that money may of 
course be used to prevent the making of creative cultural works, but it is a clash that is in the core of 
capitalism, because debt itself requires a degree of return if capitalism is to work, and thus a degree 
of certainty as determined by the economic system itself. We should not seek to capitalise on our 
imaginative endeavour if capitalisation does not equate to the inner creativity. Capitalism should be 
considered a means by which creative endeavour can be realised, but if humankind is to follow the 
trajectory of creativity, our own inner conception of creativity is what needs to be focused upon as the 
primary director of the flow of regulation. This is not something that is true just of capitalism, it is true 
of all other forms of interpretation of creativity. Property concepts may have the same criticism made 
of them, as can other forms of exchange such as technical code. Whichever system is being utilised as 
a means by which to enable or disable creativity, the State itself should develop a means by which the 
impact or parallelism of the systems with creativity can be monitored.   
                                                          
54 Cf. Reckwitz, who suggests that it is perhaps suprising that creativity has become more important in recent 
history. The remainder of this chapter and the next two chapters should make clear to the reader why this 
should not be surprising at all. Furthermore, he argues “..from a sociological point of view, creativity was 
present in modernity yet was essentially limited until around the 1970s to cultural and social niches.” 
Throughout this monograph, it is argued that creativity has been centrally important to the creation of the 
State. See A Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity, Polity Press (2017) at 4, and 5 on restructuring around 
creativity.  
55 Infra Chapter **. 
56 Cf. the notion of striation – see infra Chapters Two and Three, and G Deleuze and F Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, Continuum (2004). 
57 Infra Chapter **. 
58 J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943) argues in Chapter VII that creativity is a part of 
economic competition, but he overlooks two points: a) the utilisation of property to provide economic 
boundaries for, e.g. copyright works, and b) that technology can provide for exchange which is smaller than a 
self-viable single economic unit (i.e. the cost to administer exceeds the value of the unit). 
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Creativity is all around us.  Creativity is not just limited to an act of the mind; creativity can exist 
independently of it.59 Creativity is not just a concept to describe a process of making, it is far more 
important and central than that.  If it were not for creativity, no single human being would be alive 
today.   Be one of scientific or religious conviction, in favour of the scientific big bang theory or a 
religious moment of creation, creativity is a starting point at which the human act of imagination 
begins.  Any creative act today has a seamless relationship with that very first act of creation within 
the human body, and all the thoughts of the human race.  Not only that, the seamless creative link 
passes through to the very creative processes in the brain.  Energy and matter is at work, the moment 
of creation passing through to be within the person, within the societies that people make.60  
Everything is interlinked; and that link is the creative process.  In view of how important the creative 
act is, then, is it not curious that today we rarely directly address in our laws that question what is 
creativity and how it impacts our daily lives.61  Perhaps this is partly because if one imagines such a 
future, it immediately calls to mind a dystopian one, akin to 1984 – and the spectre of thought control 
: 
"The thought police would get him just the same. He had committed--would 
have committed, even if he had never set pen to paper--the essential crime 
that contained all others in itself. Thoughtcrime, they called it. Thoughtcrime 
was not a thing that could be concealed forever. You might dodge successfully 
for a while, even for years, but sooner or later they were bound to get you."62 
Perhaps there is a deep-seated fear,63 an innate knowledge that creativity is so central to our being, 
our inner self that to regulate it is a potential horror; we instinctively cast aside all thoughts to that 
end. Historically, the Christian religion at one time sought to control heretical thought – notably with 
the attempts at censorship and the inquisitions64 – but even then, the notion of inwardness remained: 
even if the Church never admitted it, it was possible that inner thought could diverge from the dogma 
of the Church. The same is true of other societies: Communist China at the height of Mao’s powers 
instituted methods to control the expression of inner thought,65 but could not directly change the 
                                                          
59 Cf. A Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Sovenir Press (1954) at 4. 
60 Moving beyond the Orgone Machine theory of Reich – W Reich, The Function of the Orgasm [Volume I of 
the Discovery of the Orgone] (trans. V Carfagno), Farrar, Strauss and Giroux (1942), see E Bohm, On Creativity 
(1996) esp. the Introduction in the Routledge edition by Leroy Little Bear (2004). 
61 Cf. Reckwitz, who makes an argument that in terms of aesthetics creativity has become strived for. This 
monograph fundamentally disagrees with this position. In the following three chapters the argument is made 
that capitalism mirrors creativity and that creativity itself has been neglected. In the mind of the author of 
this monograph, Reckwitz has neglected this point. A Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity, Polity Press (2017) 
Chapter 4. 
62 G Orwell, 1984 (1949; Penguin (2004)) Book I Chapter I 
63 A parallel can be drawn with the notion of discomfort – J Pezeu-Massabuau, A Philosophy of Discomfort, 
Reaktion Books (2012) at 33. 
64 See J Green & N Karolides, Encyclopaedia of Censorship, Facts on File (2005) at 108. For general discussion 
see P Yu, “Of Monks, Scribes and Middlemen” [2006] Michigan State Law Review 1 at 6 and D MacCulloch, A 
History of Christianity, Allen Lane (2009) at 769-776. 
65 See inter alia J Chang, J Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, Vintage (2005), M Meinser, Mao’s China and 
After: A History of the Peoples Republic, Simon and Schuster (1999). 
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deeper innermost thoughts of people. Even if the greater realm of knowledge may have not been so 
accessible, the ability remained to be able to think as an individual. By contrast the possibilities of 
regulation based around creativity– for instance effecting innermost thought - could be highly invasive, 
involving constant surveillance of every thought process. However, such a nefarious approach has not 
been something actively pursued to date in the West, although there have been clear attempts to limit 
access to copyright works to limit re-use of those works – for instance, with p2p file sharing case law.66  
The focus on creativity and thought does not need to be so dystopian, in fact quite the opposite. It 
could just as naturally be utopian- maximising the potential for each individual’s own creative and 
imaginative re-use. However, there is a fundamental issue with creativity, in that each of us can share 
the same thoughts and ideas. Maximised creativity within society could demand a coherent societal 
approach avoiding duplication, which in turn inherently limits certain types of other creativity; a 
system of maximised creativity restricts the unknown, accidental events of creation.67 By contrast, 
unrestricted creative acts have the potential to harm others, e.g. the 'creative murderer',68 or the 
creative accounting in the banking crisis of 2007 and 2008.69 One may therefore suggest that the ideal 
utopian system is one that regulates some, but not all, creative acts. When considering the current 
regulatory regimes in most Western countries, this indeed is what we have: laws against murder, laws 
against financial crimes. Any consequence upon thought processes is a consequence of regulating the 
act. Consequently, in general laws do indirectly regulate creative thoughts by focusing on their 
expression. 
However, the focus on deliberate, harming, acts is but one field in those of the regulation of creativity. 
As mentioned above, the broadest approach can be found in the core of capitalism. Humankind has 
long employed money as a means for the exchange of goods.70 Capitalism, the process of creating 
profit from debt,71 has become the most prominent means by which there is both a State and 
normative regulation of creativity. Units of exchange are both potentially 'creative' whilst also 
representing an exchange of a value which in turn is representing a creative act. For example, a bank 
may wish to fund a loan on a business in exchange for profit stemming from the creative act of a 
business. The bank, however, by virtue of the security it may gain, may seek to capitalise on that loan 
by the loaning out of more money than it actually owns, for instance to another company. The former 
is an act of representative capitalism, and the latter is an act of creative capitalism.72  In the former 
                                                          
66 Infra p.***. 
67 A Reckwitz has discussion concerning this regarding aesthetics – see A Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity, 
supra Error! Bookmark not defined. at 232-235. 
68 T De Quincey, On murder considered as one of the fine arts ((1827) OUP, 2009)) at 8-34. 
69 See inter alia G Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises, OUP (2012); C Mackay, Extraordinary Popular 
Delusions, Bentley (1841), Chapters 1-4. 
70 J Weatherford, The History of Money, Crown (2009). 
71 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) supra 24: “A particular 
banker lends among his customers his own promissory notes, to the extent, we shall suppose, of a hundred 
thousand pounds. As those notes serve all the purposes of money, his debtors pay him the same interest as if 
he had lent them so much money. This interest is the source of his gain.” Book II, Chapter II  
72 Cf. J Schumpeter,  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943), who does not make the distinction, even 
though this has a bearing upon the notion of the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) ibid. 
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example, the creative acts of the company are being represented by financial investment, and in the 
latter the creative act is in the making of capital.  The role of capital in those two situations is different. 
It is in any event important to realise that creativity in capitalism is not just creative capitalism itself, 
but that it can just be a representation of creativity. Capitalist exploitation is the bedrock upon which 
our whole system of intellectual creativity law (note – normally termed 'Intellectual Property Law') is 
based - proprietary capital. We pay for works with a token representative of a creative act – money – 
and not a directly creative act ourselves. Any creativity we enjoy at this stage is merely in the selection, 
or purchase, of the creations of others. This occurs throughout society – capitalism acts as an 
intermediary unit by which to represent creative acts. It is therefore misleading to assume that 
capitalism itself is the means by which creativity exists. Mere investment does not guarantee creativity, 
yet many courts do make such an assumption.73 So do the various statutes concerned.74 The issue is 
that over time, we have come to associate the two. Deleuze and Guattari cite capitalism as the basis 
for civilisation, arguing that capitalism is ultimately ‘schizophrenic’ because if ultimate realisation of 
capitalism is reached, then the capitalist system will obliterate itself.75 However, it will not – for 
capitalism is based, predicated, upon the creative process. Creativity has always been a constant; an 
on-going event during the existence of the human race. 
If creativity is so central, if it is so important to the development of life, of society, and the individual, 
we should recognise this within our laws. We may not do so today because of our universal wariness 
towards the State, but the world is changing and we will become increasingly aware of the centrality 
of creativity within society. The main difference that is wrought upon the world is the stripping bare 
of the legal and capitalist edifice, with machinic technology revealing that capitalism is a mere means 
of the representation of creativity, and that capitalism is not the creative process in itself.  The moment 
these technological changes make us more aware of our creative potential, the more that they raise 
our expectations of what we can, even should do, we will begin to observe clearly that some of our 
laws, some of our conceptions of capitalism, are not concerning creativity but exist merely to maintain 
the existing capitalistic order. This is something more than Barlow’s proclamation of Internet 
independence: “We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by 
race, economic power, military force, or station of birth.”76 This is something more than a mere 
rebellion by a new class of creative content owners, or a regulatory turf war. This is a stripping bare of 
the inertia of state regulations and leaders that capitalism is a principle for them, appropriate to 
represent vested interests and vested means of regulation. Creativity in its various guises remains a 
vital element in life for all human beings, and attempts to restrict it simply will spell the end of the 
state of capitalism: 
‘Creators of the World Unite’ 
                                                          
73 For example in the UK Designers Guild v Williams [2000] 1 WLR 2416, or in the US Grokster v MGM 545 US 
913 (US Supreme Court, 2005), see infra p. ***. 
74For instance, the reference to property in the UK in s1(1) CDPA 1988, s2(1) TMA 1994, and s30(1) Patents 
Act 1977; in the US see e.g. 17 USC §201 (d).  
75 G Deleuze and F Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (1977; Continuum (2004)) esp. Chapter IV Section 10 e.g. at 244 
referring to civilisation and capitalist production. 
76 J Barlow, ‘Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (1996) in N Spiller, Cyber_Reader, Phaidon Press 
(2002) at 270. 
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Reform needs to not just be a restatement of existing capitalistic and governance endeavours. It needs 
a wholesale reconsideration of the function of creativity in society. Though we cannot specifically 
define creativity; though we cannot scientifically identify it (though we may try), we can at least 
recognise it, we know where it might be and we can see, if we open our eyes, how important it has 
been to the development of society. We can see that creativity can be both a factor for good and also 
a factor for evil. What cannot be allowed is the stifling of creativity because if that happens, the State 
is no more – the life in that State would be effectively extinguished. So, to maintain that State life, we 
need to consider regulation that has creativity at the core, an explicit rationalisation and realisation of 
how important it is for every individual within the State, for the State itself, for the entire world. We 
need laws that apply and realise this importance, and we need a public who can identify and value 
that importance.  
How, then, do we reach the stage of implementing a system that recognises creativity – along with 
that vital question of doing so without raising that spectre of mind control? One of the first and not 
insubstantial challenges is to be able to institute such a principle over areas of law concerning the 
making of things. It is this aspect that the monograph focuses upon. It may be the case that regulation 
that has principally been called ‘Intellectual Property Law’ was that which tangentially dealt with 
creativity in the sense that it dealt with creative cultural works,  but as we have shown it is much wider 
than the traditional formulation. There is a need, therefore, to have a holistic recognition of creativity. 
This is to provide a basis for discourse, of discussion, and to at least recognise that it is possible to 
have, in some forms at least, an ontologically correct legal order.77 When laws are being applied, or the 
laws are effecting the production actions of the populace, or when one person intends to use the law 
against another, the way in which individuals’ creativity is impacted needs to be appreciated. In history, 
the biggest challenges to any centralised system of policy that is non-capitalist has been a lack of 
control by the centre in the application of law. We have seen this throughout history, from the times 
of the French Revolution,78 through to Communist Russia and Mao’s China,79 where the original policy 
aims of the State have been subverted to result in a group or groups maintaining political control. 
Capitalism, with its “invisible hand”80 leading to each individual acting for their own benefit but also 
benefitting the overall creation of wealth, has not been subject to such political concern.81 Creativity 
likewise has an “invisible hand” but society has developed in a way where it has become based around 
the concept of exchange and debt, and less so around the innate nature of creativity. What is needed 
is a way by which to draw out of people the means by which creativity becomes an inherent, common 
sense, ‘good.’ Provided that the law is appropriately structured it is suggested that this can become so, 
                                                          
77 D Koepsell, 'The Ontology of Cyberspace', Open Court (2000). 
78 W Doyle, Oxford History of the French Revolution, OUP (2003), D Guerin & I Patterson Class Struggle in the 
First French Republic, Pluto Press (1977), D Andress, The Terror: civil war in the French Revolution, Abacus 
(2006), A Forrest, Paris, the provinces and the French Revolution, Bloomsbury (2004) 
79 See inter alia J Chang, J Halliday, supra 65, Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson (2003).  
80 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) supra 24 Book IV, Chapter 
II, §9. 
81 By way of explanation – this is not to argue that there have not been attempts to regulate it, but that the 
core of the “invisible hand” remains regardless. 
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but to enhance the creative invisible hand will require initial direction from the State – as, it should be 
noted, was the case with capitalism.  
From the start, therefore, creativity as a guiding principle may become diluted through its application, 
and so there is a need to identify an initial framework or means by which creative actions are 
encouraged and enabled. Here, the starting point of this monograph is to focus on the principal 
product of creativity from the mind, the creative work – today, what is often a copyright work or 
invention. However, an important reason for focusing more upon copyright is that it will increasingly 
become the primary means of legal regulation.82 This may seem a startling point – today we (arguably) 
tend to emphasise the function of contracts as the most central form of regulation of day-to-day 
capitalism, however:  anything produced to run on a digital device has the extreme likelihood of being 
considered, under copyright law, as a literary work – it just has to meet the very low subsistence 
requirements.83 Combine that factor with the rise of 3D printing and scanning, and further the 
possibilities for biological and printing and programming, which will see the “literaturisation” of 
everyday objects and bodies, and the possibility for the endless scope of copyright regulation becomes 
apparent.  Consequently, an amendment of copyright is chosen as the basis for the majority of future 
regulation (rather than patents or inventions, although the same principles could apply to those as 
well). It is a natural consequence of the function of creativity that mere ‘creativity’ subject based 
regulations should become the centre point of regulation itself: a self-fulfilling prophecy in the 
knowledge-based economy where knowledge is king, and where it is proposed that creativity will 
supersede capitalism as the main driver of human progress. 
So, with that centrality of literary regulation in mind, the scene is set for a consideration of how to 
regulate the outcomes of creative acts such as copyright works. Currently the system is largely bound 
by capitalist principles – capitalism being, recalling the above, a system based upon creativity, and 
principally representative of it. The trouble is that the copyright system is one based around capitalist 
proprietary exploitation, to the degree to which that proprietary concerns can trump or pre-empt the 
creativity concerns per se. Property may be used creatively, but the issue is that it can be used purely 
to ‘land grab’, inhibiting future development, in the same way that capitalism itself can through the 
desire to realise debts.84 This can be seen in some recent 3DP lawsuits.85 Creativity can be both a 
destructive or co-operative creativity. Withholding ‘creativity’ is a threat to the development of society. 
To identify when that threat exists, it is both necessary and prudent to consider the relationship 
between law itself, and how law is utilised. This is not just a means of identifying the impact of the law 
but also the means by which to consider the impact of law upon the minds of the public independently 
from within the mind of the individual.  Whilst there are many categorisations and analytical 
interpretations of the impact of law upon individuals – rationality, authority, recognition, ‘living law’ 
                                                          
82 For more detail see Chapter 8 p. **. 
83 For discussion see Chapter 3 p.**. 
84 C MacKay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds Volume I (1841) supra 69 at 1-97. 
85 See inter alia http://www.3ders.org/articles/20141204-3d-systems-and-formslabs-settle-sla-technology-
lawsuit-royalties-to-3d-systems.html settlement - 3D systems v Formlabs SDNY District Court Civil Action No. 




to name but a few which this work discusses86 – an overriding concern often neglected is the issue of 
the threat as perceived by the individual. There are specific attempts to regulate ‘the threat’ – from 
threatening criminal acts through to what are known as ‘unjustified threats’ of patent and trade mark 
infringement. The existence of these opens up further issues of the impact of those laws:- the ‘threat 
in bringing a threat action.’ In essence, this is a question of how the inner creativity of the individual 
him or herself relates to the broader creativity within the State. Ultimately, once that central keystone 
of creativity is assessed and correctly implemented within the legal system, there should need to be 
no separation between the law and the individual – both should be in harmony due to the realisation 
of creativity. This is meant in the sense that whilst there may be action which poses a challenging 
creativity, i.e. the individual challenging the State –there will not be the lacuna of creativity due to 
threats of legal action if the law is appropriately structured. 
Once the issue of application is resolved, regulation should become concerned with being ontologically 
correct in terms of its structure and in terms of its content. This then, coupled with growth in copyright 
–literary style protection, and the increasing abilities of technical reproduction, leads to new 
possibilities of regulation. The nature of newer forms of technology allows for greater 
interconnectedness, allowing law to become more directly involved in the technical process itself – 
and therefore more possibilities for the law to be able to encourage creativity. Today, there are many 
technologies that remain independent of direct regulation but this will change with the development 
of technologies which focus upon either augmentation or real world association (e.g. through the use 
tagging, or watermarking of 3DP objects both for commercialisation and to enable licensing for 
printing).87 This is why ontological correctness is so important if law is to adequately interface with the 
digital environment. If it does so, this will change the way in which we as individuals have in the recent 
past associated ourselves with the State. We will become more focused around creativity as the basis 
for our relationships rather than systems like capitalism which are mere representations of the creative 
process. To focus on creativity rather than crude ‘misrepresentations’ of the process, as by capitalism, 
is imperative if the human race is to continue to develop in future and reach for, and be once again of, 
the Stars. It is to this aim and purpose that this work is dedicated.  
(3) An outline of the following chapters 
The next chapter analyses creativity to question why it is so central to society,88 and assesses how 
individual creativity has helped to form the State – as in the crystallisation of creative flow which led 
to State structures. It then proceeds to query to what degree State regulation has begun to move away 
from the core concerns of creativity. In order to do so, the chapter considers how individuals’ own 
creativity is influenced by the creativity of others as encapsulated by the entity of the State. Creative 
                                                          
86 J Rawls, Theory of Justice, OUP (1976), M Weber, Economy and Society (1922; University of California Press, 
1978, Vols I and II); H Hart, The concept of law, 3rd edition, OUP (2012); A Simmons, Authority, in Estlund, 
Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, OUP (2012); L Brandeis, The living law 10 Illinois Law Review 461 
(1916); E Ehrlich, Fundamental principles of the sociology of law, Harvard University Press (1936). For 
discussion see Chapter 2. 
87 J Griffin, A proposal for a bridge of licensing over a sea of IP uncertainty: Digital Watermarking of 3D 
Printed Content’ in H Chan, H Choo, J Griffin and O Osuji (eds), Intellectual Property Rights and Emerging 
Technology: 3D printing in China, Routledge (2018). 
88 Infra p.**. 
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conflict and collaboration are key, with collaboration leading to more iterative progression, whereas 
conflict leads to larger jumps. In essence this is discussion of Platonic v Nietzschian89 creativity, so that 
analysis is itself - although applied in a novel way - is nonetheless analysis that has been much 
discussed.90 However, there has been limited application of that discussion through to the link 
between the creative individual and the State sphere,91 with that limited application being reduced to 
implicit assumptions, i.e., in works such as Moore’s Utopia.92 Some of the later debate concerning 
theories of knowledge touches again upon the issue of creativity - in particular the works of Locke, 
Hume and Condillac (and Leibnitz’s response to Locke’s work),93 though they all skirt around the issue 
of where creativity comes from. Creativity and the relationship through to the State is not clearly 
enunciated. Theories of agency (Parsons),94 and Giddens’ notion of structuration,95 also do not address 
the critical issue of creativity. Nonetheless, whilst they do not explicitly acknowledge this, their 
theories do rest necessarily upon creativity, in the functional relationship of creativity through to the 
State. Some analogy can be identified, though again implicitly, to a degree, through works which deal 
with State architecture, both physical and intangible.  For instance, Lessig’s discussion of the design of 
cities,96 or the work of Bauhaus’ Gropius97 – these indicate that the creative architectural act of one 
person or a group of people, as regulated by or encouraged by the State, will have a consequence upon 
the expression of creative thought. This is also seen in the recent discussion concerning creative hubs 
and cities.98 Again, some discussion can be relevant which is of a broader analysis – e.g. discussion of 
capitalism, and property rights, to name but two99 – but again these do not concern the deeper core 
                                                          
89 A Plato, The Republic (380BC) – which emphasises imitation; cf F Nietzsche, The Gay Science (2nd edition, 
1887, trans Kaufmann, Random House edition 1974) Book III §110. 
90 L Zemer, “The making of a new copyright Lockean” 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 891 at 939 
quoting  Adams, Where Do Our Ideas come from? – Descartes and Locke, in S Stilch (ed), Introduction to 
Innate Ideas, University of California Press (1975) at 78. However, this should be treated with caution, for 
Descartes writes, there are “three classes: innate, adventitious and made up” R Descartes, Meditations on 
First Philosophy: Objections and Replies, in “On Meditation Three: Innate ideas” (R Descartes, Meditations on 
First Philosophy, 1986 CUP edition) at 78. 
91 Note M Cicero, De Officius (44 BC)  discusses that privacy has no place in the State, a discussion which 
could be deemed parallel to a discussion about secretive creativity kept away from the eyes of the State. 
However, this is more akin to the public-private debate mentioned above infra p.***. 
92 I.e. in terms of how individuals own creative actions may impact the ideal utopian society. T Moore, Utopia 
(1516; Penguin (2012)). 
93 J Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Knowledge (1690) supra 40, Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (1748) supra 40, E Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746) supra 40 and G 
Liebnitz, New Essays on the Human Understanding (1765) supra 40.  
94 T Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, Free Press (1977).  
95 A Giddens, The Constitution of Society, Polity Press (1984). 
96 L Lessig, Code, Basic Books (1999) Appendix I 
97 W Gropius, Scope of Total Architecture, Collier Books (1956); W Gropius, The New Architecture and the 
Bauhaus, MIT Press (1935). 
98 See inter alia P Cooke and L Lazzeretti (ed), Creative Cities, Cultural Clusters and Local Economic 
Development, Edward Elgar (2008); A Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity, supra Error! Bookmark not 
defined. Chapter 7. 
99 For discussion see infra **. 
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of creativity per se. It is the nature of creativity that binds society together and so it is that we need to 
analyse and critique if society is to become more ontologically concerned with its core. 
The subsequent third chapter considers the issue of creativity within the individual.100 Both are at the 
core of the human experience, and yet are merely represented at the State level by concepts such as 
capitalism. Creativity underlies everything that we do. However, the levels at which creativity exists 
are important to identify if creativity is to be recognised as a core condition of regulation. Within the 
individual there is identified an ‘inner creativity’ which the State cannot interfere with, other than to 
‘destroy’ the brain in which they exist – the ultimate bio-power.101 There is, however, an ‘outer 
creativity’ – those aspects influenced by giving and receiving expression - and it is this that the State 
can and does seek to affect. This differentiation identifies the realm of the sovereignty of regulation. 
The notion of property, it is suggested, is an attempt to breach that distinction. By placing an individual 
within ‘property’ undesired expressions are kept cabined by the State, as well as the otherwise un-
regulable inner creativity. To the outside, the person is living in their ‘Castle’ but within, property can 
limit the actions of the individual. It is this same proprietary characteristic that is at work within 
properties given over our intangible intellectual property rights, particularly copyrights. A copyright – 
which is legally a property right – endeavours to achieve the same. The property ‘fixes’ the work, it 
legally prevents others from utilising “too much” (an infringement of a substantial part).102 Whilst 
intangible property cannot prevent the deeper inner creativity of the minds of others re-utilising 
copyright elements, it can help to limit the expression of the expressed ideas in future. Property then 
acts as a potential suppressor of creativity, with the possibility of increasingly bureaucratic regulation 
which emphasises the inherent proprietary concerns over the underlying creative ones. Thus 
regulation and the creativity of the individual become divorced. Of course, that is to some degree an 
oversimplification. Elements of a work can still be reproduced, e.g. ideas, and so a reduced degree of 
‘reproductive’ creativity can take place there. Furthermore, we should not neglect to consider that 
‘piracy’ takes place, that fan fiction is often uploaded (which would otherwise be copyright 
infringements), to name but a few.103 Indeed, such ‘subversive’ acts may give encouragement to more 
iconoclastic, bigger, creative jumps.104 However, it remains the case that the regulation of these acts 
has become discordant from consideration of the underlying, broad, creative process in terms of the 
individual, and the link in creativity terms, between the individual and society.  
The fourth chapter focuses upon the developing difference between the creative zone of discourse 
and the administrative core of crystallised concepts.105 An individual may be swayed or influenced by 
the State in what they create, and yet as Chapter two demonstrates, the State itself is an administrative 
crystallisation of creative acts. Efficacious regulation should accord with the actions of the inner 
creativity of an individual. It is the degree of accordance of creativity with a legal system that affords 
for rationality. However, what the chapter identifies is that although initial regulation did directly 
                                                          
100 Infra p.**. 
101 See discussion infra. p.***. 
102 Infra p. **. 
103 See inter alia M Greenberg, Comic Art, Creativity and the Law, Edward Elgar (2015). 
104 See e.g. “Damien Hirst to publish tell-all autobiography” at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-
arts-26915100  (last accessed 31 July 2014). 
105 Infra p.**. 
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concern creativity in the broadest sense, from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the focus began 
to shift. For instance, rules similar to copyright – licensing – were at the time of Henry VIII based around 
censorship.106 Over time this shifted to regulation by publishers for the purpose of protecting their 
proprietary interests. By the time of the Statute of Anne 1710,107 authors were transferring their newly 
given property rights to publishers and a property based, capitalist, system was supplementing one 
based around creativity. That is not to suggest that the proprietary system was not based on creativity 
– it was – but the underlying structural web of creativity crystalized by the State began to be obscured. 
Whilst rules were originally concerned with the regulation of creative cultural works, proprietary 
reasoning soon established itself, and it is through that approach that our current system of capitalist 
proprietary exploitation has taken hold. That system does so at the expense of the ontology of 
creativity which underlies our whole society and State. Without such creativity our State would 
collapse and so the capitalist diversion and obfuscation is an inherently dangerous and destructive 
modality of communication.  
Ultimately, the capitalist proprietary discourse has been utilised in a manner which favours certain 
proprietary interests in a way which displaces the traditional creativity dialogue. The means by which 
this occurs is discussed (as opposed to the reasons for it which are in chapter three). Discourse is a 
means by which the direction of dialogue between society and the individual is forced apart and away 
from creativity to create a three way dialogue with proprietary stakeholders at its core. It is by this 
process that the spectre of a capitalist proprietary system of exploitation has arisen which has become 
far removed from the original reasons for the creation of society and State. A bureaucratic and neutral 
core has developed to facilitate that system of exploitation and the associated parcelling and 
ownership of capitalist representations of creativity.108 That proprietary assertion has led to the 
capitalistic exploitation of creativity as a commonality. However, that parcelling and ownership is 
inherently fallacious, for creativity is the basis for capitalism. Capitalism represents the creative 
process - it is not the creative processes itself but it depends upon creativity for its very existence – 
even if, as this work suggests, capitalism misrepresents the creative process. That symbiotic 
relationship between creativity and capitalism is the ‘invisible hand’ of capitalism. Although discourse 
is aimed at establishing property and capitalist exploitation as the core of literary and artistic 
endeavour, it is not a mere construct that replaces the operation of the interactivity between the state 
and the individual. The neutral administration and bureaucratisation of property is anything but; it is 
an attempt to force an ‘inner state’, an ‘inner dialogue’ which seeks to undermine and divert the critical 
operation of the State as a creative, cohabitive, collaborative and co-operative entity which was the 
consequence of creative and not solely proprietary endeavours. Any attempt to separate capitalism 
from creativity is doomed to failure (but not vice versa!), because without creativity capitalism is 
nothing.109 It is therefore time to return to a restatement of the principles of creativity: a return to the 
                                                          
106 Following a proclamation in 1529 – see Ransom, The First Copyright Statute (1956) at 121. 
107 ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned’, 8 Anne  c.19. 
108 For discussion of bureaucracy see M Weber, Economy and Society (1922; University of California Press, 
1978) at 956 – 1005 (Volume II).  
109 Consider the most recent debates in the press about creative accounting and debt management by States. 
If all debt is removed, then there would be no risky lending, and consequently less ability to obtain funding 
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original principles on which the State was originally predicated. Some attempts at this approach have 
been made by Steiner and Beuys,110 a theorist and an artist respectively, who have identified this split 
between what they term the inner spiritual self, and politics and economics. This monograph is more 
predicated in the development of the original notion of the State, and thus argues that creativity is the 
underlying core of all three of Steiner’s and Beuys’ elements.   
Of course, such a discussion and realisation only takes us so far. We need to work our way back to the 
creative light to take heed of our creative endeavours, and to be able to re-engage with a State founded 
around creativity reasoning.  As outlined earlier in this introductory Chapter, one of the key methods 
of achieving this is to accept that the State – individual relationship occurs at many levels but that the 
foundation of these remains creativity. The nature of that relationship, independently of creativity per 
se, has been much discussed, from the analysis of the individual being independent of the State111 
through to modern day discussions such as those concerning natural and positivist law.112 Creativity 
remains key – so, the question as far as central analysis must be how creativity is potentially affected 
by the State. Naturally, each individual will be influenced by the State regulation in different ways due 
to different circumstances, but there is another situation we should consider first and that is the 
relationship of the individual vis-à-vis another individual using law. After all, the initiation of States 
stemmed from a degree of group pluralism113 and so our discussion should likewise accept the 
importance of private relations. Today, much of this is governed through provisions of law dealing with 
threats, from the use of contracts through to wider civil and criminal laws, through to remedies. There 
are even specific IP threats provisions. This is, in effect, the law ‘stating’ that the use of its rules by 
others can be changed or affected in unexpected ways. There is nothing new here – it is prominent in 
the work of Hohfeld114 – but what is different is the idea that creativity can form such a central role. 
Why? Because threats are a consequence of flexibility in the law that has arisen purely because of the 
lack of communication and rationalisation around creativity. The lack of any correct or coherent 
ontology has meant that the debates and discoveries between individuals has focused on nebulous 
concerns – such as property and capitalism. Today most people would probably suggest that a property 
ownership document or money in the form of coins and banknotes is something that provides for 
‘certainty.’ However, it does not – it is highly volatile and uncertain compared to creativity, simply 
because property ownership is from the State whereas creativity is from within. Creativity is the one 
constant, the most certain thing that we have. It cannot be taken away unless we are killed, as in 
Bronowski’s ‘push button order.’115 It is the core of our being. Creativity is core to what we are. 
Creativity is that central basis of our relationship with society which cannot be removed. It is creativity, 
that thing most intimate to us, that is the most certain and important basis for life. Money, capitalism 
and property is but a side show, an attempt to subvert dialogue away from that core of creativity. To 
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focus on creativity would be to provide for law which would reduce the need for specific provisions to 
govern the misuse of those laws, because the laws would be perceived as more rational. 
Once the issue of the regulation of threats has been adequately addressed – which is in part dependent 
upon the reforms that will subsequently be discussed – there is then the broader issue of re-orientating 
the regulation of the State around creativity.  The challenges posed in establishing a dialogue based 
around creativity is that it tends to disfavour the importance of reproduction in enabling creativity. 
Chapter six is a discussion of the degree to which the notion of reproductive flow has taken hold within 
society, notwithstanding attempts by the State to propertise such reproductions, and shows how 
concepts such as memes116 and information flows117 are insufficient to explain the full importance of 
reproduction. It is a debate which is the direct opposite to the establishment of a State based capitalist 
or proprietary dialogue. Reproductive flow is a significant remnant of our earlier biological associations 
with creativity. However, it is very symptomatic of our times118 that Dawkins coined the meme phrase 
yet limited reference is made by him or indeed other discussants119 of the term to the earlier Platonic 
form – which lends itself back to discussion about creativity in earlier civilisations and how that played 
a function within the development of the State. Today, it has only been with the shift in technology 
back to the symbiotic individualist-global era of Internet communication and decline in applicability of 
State regulation and importantly, rationality, that the reproductive flow has begun to be discussed 
once again, and thus a reinstitution, at a subconscious level, of some consideration of the link between 
reproduction and creativity within a mainstream debate at the societal level.  
Technology that enables easier reproduction and distribution has been, and is, the key here, because 
this is more ontologically geared towards representing the human creative process. It is this ontological 
shift that has been the cause of recent questioning of whether the State and its regulations match the 
wishes of any creative individual.  Mass piracy in the face of prohibiting legislation would indicate that 
in some situations the individual is opposed to State control in making lesser creative re-uses, i.e. 
reproducing copyright works in themselves, or making more creative re-uses which may nonetheless 
be infringements of copyright.  However, it is more than just this, because the technology has enabled 
individuals to interact more easily and consequently, this has led to significant changes in the 
relationships between individuals and the State – hence, the Spring Uprisings and greater 
responsiveness by Government to publicly raised issues. Technology has, in effect, lifted a veil of 
ignorance from the populace.120  It identifies and makes possible a new form of exchange –by which I 
mean creative exchange. Importantly, code is the basis for that exchange. Code, therefore, is 
something that can be exchanged for other code – like money. The more something is exchanged – as 
with a meme – the more the code is valuable. Whilst it is often argued that intangible ideas can be 
easily replicated, that is a replication of something valuable in code, something which can be valued 
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in itself. So, replication of an intangible notion can be rewarded by a means other than property and 
exclusive scarcity. This, in itself is an advantage to these creative units of exchange when compared to 
traditional proprietary, capitalistic, forms.  Capitalist proprietary exploitation became associated with 
literary ideas, yet this is not needed with digital works.  Digital units of exchange do not require 
property per se, and this is why alternate forms of exploitation have been proposed, e.g. the use of 
advertising or by other associated networked sales. 121 Likewise, the sale as such is not required –and 
capitalism as such is not required –in order to achieve reward or incentive.  Free (and not just open) 
software for instance does not require a sale, it relies upon other factors such as advertising or 
licensing by a third party. Other examples are the remixes which are regulated by license on YouTube 
and Spotify.  However, for too long individuals have been in a system that favours proprietary and 
capitalist means of expressing creativity.  Dialogue has been effected, and so the means of creative 
involvement in the State has become skewed. For instance, capitalism and property rights provided a 
means by which individuals could become involved within society.  It provided, in essence, a form of 
‘idea democracy.’  Those who work hard, or in accordance with the protestant work ethic, could 
express themselves through capitalism or property.  Over time, they developed a proprietary or 
capitalist democratic entitlement, in that everyone was entitled to a property of their home, or their 
earnings through capitalism. This is integrally linked to the notion of merit.  This all applies to all 
intangible works –those of sufficient ‘merit’ such as those which meet the requirements of copyright 
subsistence122 usually obtain intellectual property protection.  Of course, this is all fine in the eyes of 
the public until those meritocratic, democratic tests of entitlement are no longer in line with the 
underlying technologies, and thus no longer in line with the public perception of creative merit.  If 
merited effort goes unrewarded, or is impeded, or even if that effort results in State persecution, then 
the individual is going to become separated from the dialogue with the state.  Examples of this can be 
found in coverage of recent IP disputes with 3DP.123 Proprietary and capitalist methods of obtaining 
reward or incentive are likely to fall by the wayside in the search for other technological means of 
expression that do reward these creative endeavours.  In effect, another form of State could develop, 
one within the Code itself.  Ultimately, there has been in part a shift away from the traditional 
proprietary capitalist exploitation, to a more economic based system focusing around the licensing of 
works and smaller units of exchange.  However, at the moment these are still heavily bound by 
proprietary concerns.   
An approach is therefore proposed which could develop into a regulatory system based around 
principles of creativity.  A system of qualitative infringement exists which could move away from tightly 
knit proprietary conceptions to standard quantitative rules governing royalty rates.  The system can be 
applied in a manner by which those accessing and re-using content are not aware of the underlying 
licensing scheme - much in the way in which YouTube and Spotify licences works.  Artists and creators 
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would operate under a separate scheme so as to reduce costs –basically such individuals could copy 
and reuse the works they choose, up to the point of commercial exploitation, utilising a royalty fund.124  
Licensing would then operate as the main system.125 The key thing is for this to be as invisible yet 
transparent to those who want to observe its operation.  The proposed scheme also needs to interface 
with existing laws and obligations –it is argued that it can, in fact, be so. 
Of course, the proposal of any new system poses a number of challenges in terms of it taking actual 
practical effect.  This is where any discussion of the principles discussed could become ensnared into 
practical dialogue of implementation, but the discussion of the proposed system is not likely to be so 
prone to that.  This is because creativity is so central to society that if discourse is becoming enmeshed 
in principles that adversely affect creativity, it is ultimately destructive to the State.  As mentioned 
earlier, debate may also appear to be about criminal laws, contracts or even tax, but the reality is that 
these concern the creative acts of individuals. Consequently, discussion of any system that favours the 
development of creativity can - and should - remain true to that creative principle, and avoid at all 
costs becoming a divorced bureaucratic separation from the creative process.  Consequently, it is 
important that the system begins with a clear statement of principle. 126  
Having established the principle, the regulation of it must be dealt with.  It is proposed that a 
combination of the existing Copyright Tribunal and the developing Digital Copyright Exchange or 
Copyright Hub could take this role.  It would be an independent body which would definitively set the 
royalty rates.  However, it has a separate and absolutely crucial function in assessing and setting the 
tone for the alignment of the state with creativity, through a technological medium.  Heidegger once 
wrote that bureaucracy was a form of technology; 127today, code can be used to help regulate and 
encourage creative acts by the public. Code can run behind the proposed system to facilitate the move 
away from traditional proprietary capitalist means of exploitation to, instead, focus upon the means 
by which creativity can be more appropriately focused upon.  This raises all manner of oft debated 
questions concerning the role of technology in society and the development of the individual,128 but 
the core concern is that the State should once again provide an appropriately structured means by 
which individuals can creatively engage to drive forward not only their own creative endeavours, but 
also the State.  The proposed system will provide the mechanism for an individual to be able to drive 
society forwards marking the start of a new liberal creative era, an era which will once again return us 
to home of the Creative State and the continuing development of humanity. 
Creō Potentia Est; Power to the People 
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